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Abstract
In a capital adequacy framework, risk measures are used to determine the minimal amount of capital
that a financial institution has to raise and invest in a portfolio of pre-specified eligible assets in order to
pass a given capital adequacy test. From a capital efficiency perspective, it is important to identify the
set of portfolios of eligible assets that allow to pass the test by raising the least amount of capital. We
study the existence and uniqueness of such optimal portfolios as well as their sensitivity to changes in the
underlying capital position. This naturally leads to investigating the continuity properties of the set-valued
map associating to each capital position the corresponding set of optimal portfolios. We pay special attention
to lower semicontinuity, which is the key continuity property from a financial perspective. This “stability”
property is always satisfied if the test is based on a polyhedral risk measure but it generally fails once we
depart from polyhedrality even when the reference risk measure is convex. However, lower semicontinuity
can be often achieved if one if one is willing to focuses on portfolios that are close to being optimal. Besides
capital adequacy, our results have a variety of natural applications to pricing, hedging, and capital allocation
problems.
Keywords: capital adequacy, risk measures, optimal eligible assets, lower semicontinuity.
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the study of a class of set-valued maps that play a natural and important role
in several areas of mathematical finance. For the sake of definiteness, we introduce our mathematical setting
focusing on a specific field of application, namely capital adequacy. The link to other financial problems is
highlighted below.
Acceptance sets, eligible assets, risk measures
Financial institutions are required by regulators to hold an adequate capital buffer to protect liability holders
from the risk of default should severe unexpected losses occur. Whether the capital base of an institution is
sufficient or not is established by a regulatory capital adequacy test that is usually based on Value at Risk
(Basel 2-3, Solvency 2) or Expected Shortfall (Basel 4, Swiss Solvency Test). Associated to this test is a risk
measure, or capital requirement rule, that determines the minimum amount of capital an institution would
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have to raise to pass the regulatory test. This minimum amount will, however, depend on how this capital is
invested once raised. Hence, the risk measure makes sense as a rule to determine capital requirements only
once a set of admissible investments has been specified. In line with the original framework described in the
seminal paper by Artzner et al. (1999), the bulk of the literature on risk measures assumes, either explicitly
or implicitly, that raised capital is held either in cash or invested in a single pre-specified traded asset, which,
using the language of Artzner et al. (2009), we call the eligible asset. It is worth emphasizing that raising
the amount of capital determined by the risk measure only ensures acceptability of the institution if this
amount is actually invested in the eligible asset.
As has been pointed out in Artzner et al. (2009) and, more recently, in Farkas et al. (2015), limiting the
investment choice to a single eligible asset instead of allowing investments in portfolios of multiple eligible
assets is inefficient in that it generally leads to higher capital requirements. Note that a lower capital
requirement does not mean that the institution is less safe. Indeed, the institution continues to satisfy
the same capital adequacy standard. It is just that to reach acceptability less capital is needed if more
investment choices are allowed.
From a mathematical perspective, a capital adequacy test is represented by an acceptance set for capital
positions. In the modelling process, one starts by specifying a space of capital positions X (typically a space
of random variables). Each element of X represents the capital (assets net of liabilities) of a company at
a pre-specified future date (time 1). The set of capital positions that are acceptable from a regulatory
perspective is represented by a suitable set A ⊂ X , which is called the acceptance set. Hence, a company
with capital position X ∈ X is deemed adequately capitalized if, and only if, X belongs to A.
If the capital position of a financial institution is not acceptable, then management needs to undertake
remedial actions to reach acceptability. The remedial action considered in this paper is raising new capital
(at time 0) and investing it in a portfolio of N frictionless and liquidly traded assets
S1 = (S10 , S
1
1), . . . , S
N = (SN0 , S
N
1 ),
which are referred to as the eligible assets. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , N} the quantity Si0 ∈ R represents the price
of one unit of the ith asset at time 0 and Si1 ∈ X represents the payoff of one unit of the same asset at time
1. We denote by M the vector subspace of X spanned by the above payoffs, i.e.
M = span(S11 , . . . , S
N
1 ).
The space M is called the space of eligible payoffs. Every element in M can be viewed as the payoff of a
suitable portfolio of eligible assets. If the Law of One Price holds, so that every portfolio generating the
same payoff has the same initial price, one can define a pricing functional pi :M→ R by setting
pi(Z) =
N∑
i=1
λiSi0, for any λ ∈ R
N such that Z =
N∑
i=1
λiSi1.
The minimal amount of capital that needs to be raised and invested in a portfolio of eligible payoffs to pass
the prescribed acceptability test is represented by the risk measure ρ : X → R defined by
ρ(X) = inf{pi(Z) ; Z ∈M, X + Z ∈ A}.
By definition, the quantity ρ(X) admits a natural operational interpretation as a capital requirement. The
risk measures introduced by Artzner et al. (1999) constitute the prototype of the above capital requirement
functionals and correspond to the simplest form of management action, i.e. raising capital and investing it
in a single eligible asset. The extension to a multi-asset framework was first dealt with, to the best of our
knowledge, in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) and later taken up in Frittelli and Scandolo (2006), Artzner et
al. (2009) and in the more comprehensive study by Farkas et al. (2015).
Optimal eligible payoffs
This paper is concerned with the study of the set-valued map E : X ⇒M defined by
E(X) = {Z ∈M ; X + Z ∈ A, pi(Z) = ρ(X)}.
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The set E(X) consists of all the eligible payoffs that ensure acceptability of the position X at the minimal
cost. The map E will be therefore called the optimal payoff map and every payoff in E(X) will be referred
to as an optimal payoff for X . In this paper we address the following theoretical questions that are critical
also from an operational perspective:
• Existence of optimal payoffs. Do optimal payoffs of eligible assets exist at all? This is equivalent
to assessing if E is not empty valued.
• Uniqueness of optimal payoffs. In case optimal payoffs exist, are they unique or does management
have several alternatives from which to choose? This is equivalent to assessing if E associates a unique
payoff to each position.
• Stability of optimal payoffs. In case several optimal payoffs exist, how robust is the choice of a
specific portfolio? More specifically, we are interested in (1) assessing if an optimal allocation remains
close to being optimal after a slight perturbation of the underlying position and (2) ensuring that
the accuracy of the optimal allocation increases with the degree of approximation of the underlying
position. This is equivalent to investigating suitable continuity properties of E : (1) corresponds to
lower semicontinuity and (2) to upper semicontinuity.
• Stability of nearly-optimal payoffs. If the choice of optimal payoffs is not robust, can we ensure
robustness by relaxing the optimality condition and looking at portfolios of eligible assets that yield
acceptability at a cost that is slightly higher than optimal? This question is of practical relevance
because, in applications, one is bound to accept a certain tolerance for deviations from optimality.
Any analysis of capital requirements would not be complete without having answered the above questions.
From a theoretical perspective, failing to answer them would amount to studying an optimization problem
focusing only on the optimal value of the objective function and not paying attention to the structure of the
solution set. From a practical perspective, finding an answer to these questions is critical since, for a capital
regime to be operationally effective, it is necessary to make sure that managers know which actions they can
undertake to meet capital requirements and that these actions are robust with respect to misestimations.
Applications to pricing, hedging, and capital allocation
The preceding questions are relevant in a variety of other areas of mathematical finance. In the context
of pricing in incomplete markets, where an element X ∈ X is interpreted as the payoff of a non-replicable
financial contract, the quantity
ρ(−X) = inf{pi(Z) ; Z ∈ M, Z −X ∈ A}
can be naturally viewed as a price (from a seller’s perspective). In this case, the elements of the acceptance
set A represent acceptable replication errors. If A is taken to be the set of positive elements of X (provided
X is partially ordered), then we obtain the standard superreplication price. If A contains also nonpositive
elements so that imperfect superreplication may be acceptable, we are in the framework of good deal pricing
or pricing under acceptable risk; see Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000), Carr et al. (2001) and Jaschke and
Ku¨chler (2001). This pricing approach has recently gained renewed attention in the framework of conic
finance developed by Madan and Cherny (2010). We also refer to Arai and Fukasawa (2014).
The risk measures studied in this paper arise naturally also in a variety of risk minimization problems related
to hedging. To see this, let X be a space of random variables containing the constants and assume X ∈ X
represents a given future exposure. Then, one can rewrite ρ as
ρ(X) = inf{ρA(X − Z + pi(Z)) ; Z ∈ M},
where ρA : X → R is the simple (cash-based) single-asset risk measure defined by
ρA(X) = inf{m ∈ R ; X +m ∈ A}.
This shows that ρ(X) can be interpreted as the minimal level of risk, as measured by ρA, at which we can
secure the exposure X by setting up portfolios of eligible assets. Note also that
ρ(X) = inf{ρA(X − Z)− pi(Z) ; Z ∈ M},
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showing that ρ can be expressed as the infimal convolution of ρA and −pi (one can always extend pi to the
entire X by setting pi(X) = −∞ whenever X /∈ M). For a thorough discussion on hedging via risk mini-
mization and the role of infimal convolutions in this setting we refer to Barrieu and El Karoui (2009) and the
references therein. Infimal convolutions of risk measures has been studied, for instance, in Jouini et al. (2008)
and Filipovic´ and Svindland (2008). We also refer to the comprehensive discussion in Ru¨schendorf (2013).
Finally, we highlight that functionals of the form ρ have been recently studied in the context of capital
allocation and systemic risk. In this setting, one interprets the elements of X as d-dimensional random vectors
whose components represent the capital positions of d financial entities (different companies, subsidiaries
of an individual company, different desks). Similarly, the elements of M are interpreted as d-dimensional
random vectors consisting of eligible payoffs (one could in principle allow for different spaces of eligible assets
along the different components) and pi is given by the aggregated sum of the individual pricing functionals.
Under these specifications, the quantity
ρ(X) = inf
{
d∑
i=1
pii(Zi) ; (Z1, . . . , Zd) ∈ M, (X1 + Z1, . . . , Xd + Zd) ∈ A
}
represents the smallest amount of capital that has to be raised and allocated, in the form of portfolios of
eligible assets, across the various entities of the system to ensure acceptability. The systemic risk measures
studied in Biagini et al. (2015) have the above form. The efficient cash-invariant allocation rules introduced
in the framework of systemic risk by Feinstein et al. (2017) are also related to the above functionals. A
variety of acceptance sets for multivariate positions has been discussed in Molchanov and Cascos (2016).
The special case corresponding to stand-alone acceptability based on Expected Shortfall is treated in Hamel
et al. (2013). The case of multivariate shortfall risk is thoroughly studied in Armenti et al. (2017).
Our contribution
While properties of risk measures themselves have been subjected to detailed scrutiny, the above four
questions have not been systematically addressed before in the risk measure literature. A variety of results
on existence (exactness in the language of infimal convolutions) and uniqueness of optimal payoffs have been
established in the context of hedging and capital allocation with risk measures for univariate positions; see
Barrieu and El Karoui (2009) and the references therein. In this paper we provide a comprehensive discussion
on existence and uniqueness in general spaces of positions, thus encompassing also the multivariate case.
However, the most important and, to the best of our knowledge, novel contribution of the paper consists
in the investigation of the critical question of stability. This question constitutes a classical problem in
optimization, more specifically in the subfield of parametric optimization; see e.g. Bank et al. (1983) and
the references therein. There, one would formulate the problem by focusing on the constraint set mapping
F : X ⇒M defined by
F(X) = {Z ∈M ; X + Z ∈ A}.
The risk measure ρ and the optimal payoff map E can be expressed in terms of the map F as
ρ(X) = inf{pi(Z) ; Z ∈ F(X)} and E(X) = {Z ∈ F(X) ; pi(Z) = ρ(X)}.
The risk measure ρ thus corresponds to the extreme value function and the optimal payoff map E to the
optimal set mapping. The study of continuity properties of optimal set mappings is a recurrent theme in
parametric optimization that goes under the names of qualitative stability or perturbation analysis. It is well-
established that, among the various notions of stability or continuity, the property of lower semicontinuity
is the most challenging to deal with. Unfortunately, it turns out that none of the (few) standard results
on lower semicontinuity can be applied to our setting; see Remark 5.8. However, the key property from
a financial perspective is precisely lower semicontinuity in that it ensures that a small perturbation in the
underlying position does not result in a dramatic change in the structure of the optimal portfolio. To address
the stability question we are thus forced to develop a variety of new results that exploit the special structure
of our optimal set mapping.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the underlying model space and list some
relevant examples. In Section 3 we discuss the basic properties of optimal payoff maps. The question
on existence and uniqueness of optimal payoffs is dealt with in Section 4. In particular, Proposition 4.2
and Corollary 4.4 highlight the link between existence and the absence of (scalable) good deals. Section 5
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is devoted to the question on stability. After focusing on outer and upper semicontinuity, we provide
a comprehensive discussion on the key property of lower semicontinuity. As illustrated by a number of
examples, lower semicontinuity may fail even in the presence of common acceptance sets. However, by
Theorem 5.11, we always have lower semicontinuity if the chosen acceptance set is polyhedral. In the last
part of the section we relax the optimality condition and focus on nearly-optimal payoffs. As a consequence
of Theorem 5.21, we are able to establish several sufficient conditions for nearly-optimal payoff maps to be
lower semicontinuous.
2 The underlying model space
In this section we describe our model for the space of positions and the space of eligible payoffs and introduce
some notation and terminology. In order to cover all special spaces of univariate and multivariate positions
encountered in the literature we work in the context of an abstract space. This also helps highlight the
fundamental mathematical structure of our problem.
The space of positions
We consider a one-period model where financial positions at the terminal date are represented by elements
of a Hausdorff topological vector space over R, which we denote by X . We assume that X is first countable
and locally convex. This means that every element of X admits a countable neighborhood base consisting
of convex sets. In particular, X could be any normed space. The topological dual of X is denoted by X ′.
The interior, the closure and the boundary of a set A ⊂ X are denoted by intA, clA and bdA, respectively.
We say that A is star-shaped (about zero) whenever X ∈ A implies that λX ∈ A for every λ ∈ [0, 1]. The
set A is said to be convex if λX + (1 − λ)Y ∈ A for any X,Y ∈ A and λ ∈ [0, 1] and a cone if λX ∈ A for
any X ∈ A and λ ∈ [0,∞). Moreover, we say that A is strictly convex whenever λX + (1− λ)Y ∈ intA for
all λ ∈ (0, 1) and any distinct X,Y ∈ A. Clearly, every convex set containing zero is star-shaped. Similarly,
every (not necessarily convex) cone is star-shaped. The smallest convex set containing A is called the convex
hull of A and is denoted by coA. The smallest cone containing A is called the conic hull of A and is
denoted by coneA. The affine hull of A, denoted by affA, is the set of all linear combinations of the form∑m
i=1 αiXi for X1, . . . , Xm ∈ A and α1, . . . , αm ∈ R summing up to 1. We say that A is polyhedral if it can
be represented as a finite intersection of halfspaces, i.e.
A =
m⋂
i=1
{X ∈ X ; ϕi(X) ≥ αi}
for suitable functionals ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ X ′ and scalars α1, . . . , αm ∈ R. In this case, we say thatA is represented
by ϕ1, . . . , ϕm; see also (1) below. Clearly, any polyhedral set is closed and convex.
The asymptotic cone of A is the closed cone defined by setting
A∞ :=
⋂
ε>0
cl{λX ; λ ∈ [0, ε], X ∈ A}.
Equivalently, A∞ consists of all the limits of sequences (λnXn) where (λn) ⊂ [0,∞) with λn → 0 and
(Xn) ⊂ A. If A is closed and either convex or star-shaped, the asymptotic cone of A coincides with the
(otherwise smaller) recession cone of A defined by
recA := {X ∈ X ; Y + λX ∈ A, ∀Y ∈ A, ∀λ ∈ (0,∞)}.
The lineality space of A is the vector space defined by linA := A∞ ∩ (−A∞).
We assume that X is partially ordered by a reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive relation≥. The corresponding
positive cone is given by
X+ := {X ∈ X ; X ≥ 0}.
In this case, the dual space X ′ can be also partially ordered by setting ϕ ≥ ψ if and only if ϕ(X) ≥ ψ(X)
for all X ∈ X+. The associated positive cone is
X ′+ := {ϕ ∈ X
′ ; ϕ(X) ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ X+}.
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An element X ∈ X+ is said to be strictly positive whenever ϕ(X) > 0 for all nonzero ϕ ∈ X ′+. The set
of strictly-positive elements is denoted by X++. Similarly, a functional ϕ ∈ X ′+ is called strictly positive
whenever ϕ(X) > 0 for all nonzero X ∈ X+.
The (lower) support function of a set A ⊂ X is the map σA : X ′ → R ∪ {−∞} defined by
σA(ϕ) := inf
X∈A
ϕ(X).
The effective domain of σA, which is easily seen to be a convex cone, is called the barrier cone of A and is
denoted by barA. We say that X ∈ A is a support point for A if there exists a functional ϕ ∈ X ′ satisfying
ϕ(X) = σA(ϕ). Every support point for A automatically belongs to bdA. Although boundary points need
not be support points, this is always true whenever A is polyhedral or dim(X ) <∞.
We collect in the following result a variety of useful properties of support functions and barrier cones; see
Aliprantis and Border (2006) and, for point (iii), Farkas et al. (2014). The lemma, in particular, tells us
that the barrier cone of a vector space, respectively a cone, coincides with its annihilator, respectively its
(one-sided) polar.
Lemma 2.1. The following statements hold for any subsets A,B ⊂ X :
(i) σA+B(ψ) = σA(ψ) + σB(ψ) for every ψ ∈ X ′.
(ii) bar(A+ B) = barA ∩ barB.
(iii) If A+ X+ ⊂ A, then barA ⊂ X
′
+.
(iv) If A is a vector space, then barA = {ϕ ∈ X ′ ; ϕ(X) = 0, ∀X ∈ A}.
(v) If A is a cone, then barA = {ϕ ∈ X ′ ; ϕ(X) ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ A}.
(vi) If A is closed and convex, then
A =
⋂
ϕ∈barA
{X ∈ X ; ϕ(X) ≥ σA(ϕ)}.
(vii) If A is polyhedral and is represented by ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ X ′, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ barA and
A =
m⋂
i=1
{X ∈ X ; ϕi(X) ≥ σA(ϕi)}. (1)
The space of eligible payoffs
The eligible payoffs are assumed to belong to a vector subspace M⊂ X with 1 < dim(M) <∞. We equip
M with the relative topology inherited from X . Since M has finite dimension, the relative topology is
always normable. In what follows we denote by ‖ · ‖ a fixed norm on M and use the notation
d(S1,S2) := inf{‖W − Z‖ ; W ∈ S1, Z ∈ S2}
for any subsets S1,S2 ⊂M. In addition, we write
Br(Z) := {W ∈M ; ‖W − Z‖ ≤ r}
for any Z ∈M and r ∈ (0,∞).
Prices of eligible payoffs are represented by a linear functional pi : M → R. Note that, being linear, pi is
automatically continuous. The kernel of pi is denoted by
ker(pi) := {Z ∈M ; pi(Z) = 0}.
We assume throughout that M contains a positive payoff with strictly-positive price (which, by linearity,
can be always normalized to 1).
Assumption 1. We assume that there exists U ∈M∩X+ such that pi(U) = 1.
The above assumption is automatically satisfied if M contains a nonzero positive payoff and the market is
free of arbitrage opportunities so that pi is strictly positive.
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The acceptance set
The acceptance set is represented by a subset A ⊂ X for which we stipulate the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. We assume that A is strictly contained in X and satisfies:
(1) A is closed and contains zero.
(2) A+ X+ ⊂ A.
The above properties are widely recognized as the minimal properties an acceptance set should satisfy.
Property (1) is satisfied by all relevant acceptance sets in theory and practice. Property (2) is referred to
as monotonicity and is equivalent to stipulating that any position that dominates an acceptable position
should also be deemed acceptable.
Note that we do not require a prioriA to be convex. The reason is that, in spite of its appealing interpretation
in terms of diversification benefits, convexity is not satisfied by some relevant acceptance sets used in practice
such as those based on Value at Risk. However, we need convexity of A to establish some of our results.
Within the class of convex acceptance sets, polyhedral sets and convex cones (sometimes called coherent
acceptance sets) are particularly tractable.
Example 2.2 (Univariate acceptability). Assume X is a standard space of random variables. For
simplicity, we take X = L∞(Ω,F ,P) and we consider the canonical almost-sure ordering on X .
(1) The Value at Risk (VaR) of a position X ∈ X at the level α ∈ (0, 1) is defined by
VaRα(X) := inf{m ∈ R ; P(X +m < 0) ≤ α}.
Hence, up to a sign, VaRα(X) coincides with the upper α-quantile of X . The corresponding acceptance set
is the closed cone given by
A = {X ∈ X ; VaRα(X) ≤ 0} = {X ∈ X ; P(X < 0) ≤ α}.
In this case, acceptability boils down to checking whether the probability of default or loss of a certain
position does not exceed the threshold α. Note that A is typically not convex. Acceptance sets based on
VaR have historically been at the core of the Basel Accords, the reference regulatory regime for the banking
sector, and of Solvency II, the regulatory regime for insurance companies within the European Union.
(2) The Expected Shortfall (ES) of X ∈ X at the level α ∈ (0, 1) is defined by
ESα(X) :=
1
α
∫ α
0
VaRβ(X)dβ.
The corresponding acceptance set is the closed convex cone given by
A = {X ∈ X ; ESα(X) ≤ 0}.
As is well-known, A is polyhedral whenever Ω is finite. To be acceptable under ES, a financial institution
needs to be solvent on average over the tail beyond the upper α-quantile. Currently, ES is the basis for the
Swiss Solvency Test, the regulatory framework for insurance companies in Switzerland, and is set to be the
risk metric for market risk in the forthcoming Basel Accord.
(3) The acceptance set based on a nonempty set of test scenarios E ∈ F is the closed convex cone
A = {X ∈ X ; X1E ≥ 0}.
Here, we have denoted by 1E the indicator function of the event E. In this case, acceptability reduces to
requiring solvency in each of the chosen test scenarios. Note that A coincides with the positive cone of X in
the case that E = Ω. Note also that A is polyhedral whenever Ω is finite. The methodology used by many
central exchanges and clearing counterparties to set up margin requirements, most notably the Standard
Portfolio ANalysis of Risk adopted by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, is based on test scenarios.
(4) The acceptance set based on a family Q of probability measures on (Ω,F) that are absolutely continuous
with respect to P is the closed convex set defined by
A =
⋂
Q∈Q
{X ∈ X ; EQ[X ] ≥ αQ}
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for suitable αQ ∈ (−∞, 0]. The elements of Q are often called generalized scenarios. Note that A is
polyhedral whenever Q is finite and conic provided that αQ = 0 for all Q ∈ Q. This type of acceptance sets
is often encountered in the literature on good deal pricing or pricing with acceptable risk.
(5) The acceptance set based on an increasing and concave utility function u : R→ R is given by
A = {X ∈ X ; E[u(X)] ≥ α}
for a suitable α ∈ (−∞, u(0)]. Note that A is strictly convex whenever u is strictly concave in the sense that
u(λx + (1 − λ)y) > λu(x) + (1 − λ)u(y) for all distinct x, y ∈ R and λ ∈ (0, 1). Acceptance sets based on
expected utility are common in the literature on good deal pricing or pricing with acceptable risk.
Example 2.3 (Multivariate acceptability). Assume X is a standard space of random vectors. For
simplicity, we take X = L∞d (Ω,F ,P) for some d ∈ N and we consider the canonical componentwise almost-
sure ordering on X .
(1) We speak of stand-alone acceptability whenever A has the form
A = C1 × · · · × Cd
where each component is an acceptance set in L∞(Ω,F ,P). According to A, the system is adequately
capitalized precisely when every entity is adequately capitalized on a stand-alone basis according to the
corresponding univariate acceptance sets.
(2) The acceptance set based on an aggregation function Λ : Rd → R is defined by
A = {X ∈ X ; Λ(X) ∈ C}
where C is a given acceptance set in L∞(Ω,F ,P). The function Λ summarizes the system and its internal
interdependencies in one figure that is tested against a univariate acceptance set.
In the framework of good deal pricing it is customary to assume that the market admits no good deals, i.e. no
payoff Z ∈ A ∩M such that pi(Z) ≤ 0. This is equivalent to requiring that every acceptable eligible payoff
must have a strictly-positive price. In view of Assumptions 1-2, the absence of good deals is equivalent to
A∩ ker(pi) = {0}.
Sometimes, one is interested in ruling out those special good deals Z ∈ M such that λZ ∈ A for all λ > 0,
which correspond to payoffs that can be purchased at zero or even negative cost and that are acceptable
regardless of their size. Inspired by the terminology introduced in Pennanen (2011), we refer to such payoffs
as scalable good deals. In view of Assumptions 1-2, the absence of scalable good deals is equivalent to
A∞ ∩ ker(pi) = {0}.
The above conditions are important to ensure some results on existence and stability of optimal payoffs.
The risk measure
The risk measure associated with the acceptance set A, the space of eligible payoffs M, and the pricing
functional pi is the map ρ : X → R defined by setting
ρ(X) := inf{pi(Z) ; Z ∈ M, X + Z ∈ A}.
For our study of existence and stability of optimal portfolios of eligible assets it is crucial to assume that ρ
take only finite values and be continuous; see Remark 5.7 for more details.
Assumption 3. We assume that ρ is finitely valued and continuous.
A variety of sufficient conditions for finiteness and continuity, which we record here for ease of reference, are
provided in Farkas et al. (2015). In particular, note that ρ cannot be finitely valued (in fact, we would have
ρ ≡ −∞) unless
A+ ker(pi) 6= X .
This condition was called absence of acceptability arbitrage in Farkas et al. (2015) and says that it is not
possible to make every position acceptable at zero cost.
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Proposition 2.4 ([18, Proposition 1, 2, 3]). Assume A + ker(pi) 6= X . Then, ρ is finitely valued and
continuous if any of the following conditions hold:
(i) intX+ ∩M 6= ∅.
(ii) A is convex and X++ ∩M 6= ∅.
(iii) A is a convex cone and intA ∩M 6= ∅.
Remark 2.5. The above conditions require the space of eligible payoffs to contain payoffs that are “suffi-
ciently risk-free”; see Farkas et al. (2015) for more details. Note that condition (i) requires the positive cone
X+ to have nonempty interior. This is always the case if dim(X ) <∞ but typically breaks down, with the
exception of spaces of bounded random variables, in an infinite-dimensional setting.
3 The optimal payoff map
The optimal payoff map associated with the risk measure ρ is the set-valued map E : X ⇒M defined by
E(X) := {Z ∈ M ; X + Z ∈ A, pi(Z) = ρ(X)}.
Every eligible payoff in E(X) is called an optimal payoff for the position X . Note that, as mentioned above,
there may exist positions X such that E(X) is empty (even though ρ(X) is finite).
The next proposition lists some useful properties of the optimal payoff map that are used throughout the
paper. To that effect, we first need to recall some basic properties of the risk measure ρ.
Lemma 3.1 ([18, Lemma 2, 3]). For any X,Y ∈ X the risk measure ρ satisfies:
(i) X ≥ Y implies ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ).
(ii) ρ(X + Z) = ρ(X)− pi(Z) for every Z ∈ M.
(iii) ρ(X) = inf{m ∈ R ; X +mU ∈ A+ ker(pi)}.
(iv) {X ∈ X ; ρ(X) < 0} = int(A+ ker(pi)).
(v) {X ∈ X ; ρ(X) ≤ 0} = cl(A + ker(pi)).
(vi) {X ∈ X ; ρ(X) = 0} = bd(A+ ker(pi)).
Proposition 3.2. For every X ∈ X the following statements hold:
(i) E(X) = {Z ∈ M ; X + Z ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A+ ker(pi))}.
(ii) E(X + Z) = E(X)− Z for every Z ∈M.
(iii) E(K) is closed for every compact set K ⊂ X .
(iv) E(X) is convex whenever A is convex.
(v) E(X) is polyhedral (in M) whenever A is polyhedral.
(vi) E(X)∞ ⊂ A∞ ∩ ker(pi).
(vii) E(X)∞ = A∞ ∩ ker(pi) if A is star-shaped and E(X) 6= ∅.
Proof. (i) Since A is closed and X + Z ∈ bd(A + ker(pi)) is equivalent to ρ(X) = pi(Z) for all X ∈ X and
Z ∈M by Lemma 3.1, the assertion is established once we show that
E(X) ⊂ {Z ∈ M ; X + Z ∈ bdA}. (2)
To this effect, take any Z ∈ E(X) and note that, by definition, we have X + Z ∈ A and ρ(X) = pi(Z).
Should X +Z ∈ intA hold, we would find a suitable ε > 0 such that X +Z − εU ∈ A. However, this would
imply that
ρ(X) ≤ pi(Z)− εpi(U) < ρ(X).
Hence, we must have X + Z ∈ bdA and this concludes the proof of (2).
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(ii) For any Z ∈ M it follows from Proposition 3.2 that
E(X + Z) = bdA ∩ bd(A+ ker(pi))− (X + Z) = (bdA ∩ bd(A+ ker(pi))−X)− Z = E(X)− Z.
(iii) Assume that K ⊂ X is compact and consider a sequence (Zn) ⊂ E(K) converging to some Z ∈ M (recall
that M is closed). For any n ∈ N we find Xn ∈ K such that Zn ∈ E(Xn). Since K is compact, a suitable
subsequence (Xnk) converges to some X ∈ K. Note that Xnk +Znk ∈ bdA∩bd(A+ker(pi)) for all k ∈ N by
virtue of Proposition 3.2. Note also that Znk → Z. As a result, we infer that X+Z ∈ bdA∩bd(A+ker(pi)),
which implies Z ∈ E(X) again by Proposition 3.2. This yields Z ∈ E(K) and concludes the proof.
(iv) Assume that A is convex and take any X ∈ X . Then, for every Z,W ∈ E(X) and for every λ ∈ [0, 1]
we clearly have
X + λZ + (1− λ)W = λ(X + Z) + (1 − λ)(X +W ) ∈ A
as well as
pi(λZ + (1− λ)W ) = λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(X) = ρ(X).
This shows that E(X) is convex.
(v) Assume A is polyhedral so that we find suitable functionals ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ X ′+ satisfying
A =
m⋂
i=1
{X ∈ X ; ϕi(X) ≥ σA(ϕi)}.
In this case, we easily see that
{Z ∈ M ; X + Z ∈ A} =
m⋂
i=1
{Z ∈M ; ϕi(Z) ≥ σA(ϕi)− ϕi(X)}. (3)
Moreover, note that
{Z ∈ M ; pi(Z) = ρ(X)} = {Z ∈ M ; pi(Z) ≥ ρ(X)} ∩ {Z ∈M ; −pi(Z) ≥ −ρ(X)}. (4)
This shows that E(X) can be expressed as the intersection of two polyhedral sets in M and is thus also
polyhedral in M.
(vi) Take any Z ∈ E(X)∞ so that λnZn → Z for a suitable sequence (λn) ⊂ R+ converging to zero and for
(Zn) ⊂ E(X). Since λn(X + Zn) → Z and X + Zn ∈ A for every n ∈ N, we see that Z ∈ A∞. Moreover,
note that Z belongs to M (since M is closed) and satisfies
pi(Z) = lim
n→∞
λnpi(Zn) = lim
n→∞
λnρ(X) = 0
by the continuity of pi, so that Z ∈ ker(pi). This proves that E(X)∞ ⊂ A∞ ∩ ker(pi).
(vii) Recall that, if A is star-shaped, we have A∞ = recA. Moreover, recall that asymptotic cones always
contain the corresponding recession cones. Hence, in light of point (v), the claim is established once we
prove that
recA ∩ ker(pi) ⊂ rec E(X). (5)
To this effect, take any Z ∈ recA ∩ ker(pi) and W ∈ E(X), which exists since E(X) is assumed to be
nonempty. We claim that, for every λ ∈ (0,∞), we have W + λZ ∈ E(X). To show this, note first that
X +W + λZ ∈ A. This follows from the fact that Z ∈ recA and X +W ∈ A. Moreover, it is clear that
pi(W + λZ) = pi(W ) = ρ(X).
This shows that W + λZ ∈ E(X) for every λ ∈ (0,∞) and establishes (5).
Remark 3.3. We show that the assumptions in point (vii) above are all necessary. Let X = R2 andM = X
and define the pricing functional pi by setting pi(X) = 12 (X1 +X2) for all X ∈ X .
10
(i) A is star-shaped but E(X) is empty. Consider the acceptance set A = A1 ∪ A2 where
A1 = {X ∈ X ; X1 ∈ [0,∞), X2 ∈ [−1,∞)}
and
A2 = {X ∈ X ; X1 ∈ (−∞, 0), X2 ≥ e
X1 −X1 − 2}.
Note that A is star-shaped. It is easy to verify that our assumptions (A1) to (A3) are all satisfied in
this setting. Moreover, we have
A+ ker(pi) = {X ∈ X ; X2 > −X1 − 2}.
Since bdA and bd(A + ker(pi)) have empty intersection, it follows from Proposition 3.2 that E(X) is
empty for every X ∈ X . However, A∞ ∩ ker(pi) contains infinitely many elements.
(ii) E(X) is nonempty but A is not star-shaped. Set αn = −n +
1
n
for every n ∈ N and consider the
acceptance set
A = X+ ∪
⋃
n∈N
{X ∈ X ; X1 ∈ [αn+1, αn), X2 ∈ [n+ 1,∞)}.
Note that A is not star-shaped and that our assumptions (A1) to (A3) are all satisfied in this setting.
Moreover, it is easy to verify that
A+ ker(pi) = {X ∈ X ; X2 ≥ −X1}.
Since E(0) = {0}, we also have E(0)∞ = {0}. However, A∞ ∩ ker(pi) is easily seen to contain infinitely
many elements.
4 Existence and uniqueness of optimal payoffs
This section is devoted to investigating under which conditions we can ensure existence and uniqueness of
optimal eligible payoffs.
Existence of optimal payoffs
We start by providing a general characterization of the global existence of optimal payoffs.
Proposition 4.1. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) E(X) 6= ∅ for every X ∈ X .
(b) E(X) 6= ∅ for every X ∈ bd(A+ ker(pi)).
(c) A+ ker(pi) is closed.
Proof. It is clear that (a) implies (b). Assume now that (b) holds but A+ ker(pi) is not closed, so that we
find X ∈ bd(A + ker(pi)) \ (A + ker(pi)). This implies that E(X) 6= ∅ and ρ(X) = 0 by Lemma 3.1 but, at
the same time, that there cannot exist Z ∈ ker(pi) with X + Z ∈ A. Since this is not possible, we conclude
that (c) must hold.
Finally, assume that (c) holds and take an arbitrary X ∈ X . Note that ρ(X + ρ(X)U) = 0 and thus
Lemma 3.1 implies thatX+ρ(X)U ∈ A+ker(pi). As a result, we find Z ∈ ker(pi) such thatX+ρ(X)U+Z ∈ A
and pi(ρ(X)U + Z) = ρ(X), proving that ρ(X)U + Z ∈ E(X). This shows that (a) holds and concludes the
proof of the equivalence.
The preceding result shows that existence of optimal payoffs is equivalent to the “augmented” acceptance
set A+ker(pi) being closed. This set has a clear financial interpretation in that it consists of all the positions
that can be made acceptable at zero cost, i.e.
A+ ker(pi) = {X ∈ X ; X + Z ∈ A for some Z ∈ ker(pi)}.
In particular, when A = X+, the above set is easily seen to coincide, up to a sign, with the set of positions
that can be superreplicated at zero cost. Establishing the closedness of A + ker(pi) is a recurrent theme in
mathematical finance. In fact, this is a special case of a classical problem in functional analysis asking when
the sum of two closed sets is still closed. As first remarked in Dieudonne´ (1966), the notion of asymptotic
cone plays an important role to establish closedness.
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Proposition 4.2. Assume the market admits no scalable good deals, i.e. A∞ ∩ ker(pi) = {0}. Then, we
have E(X) 6= ∅ for every X ∈ X .
Proof. Since ker(pi)∞ = ker(pi), it follows from the absence of scalable good deals that A∞∩ker(pi)∞ = {0}.
Moreover, being the subset of a finite-dimensional vector space, ker(pi) is easily seen to be asymptotically
compact in the sense of Barbu and Precupanu (2012). Indeed, we can always find ε > 0 and a neighborhood
of zero U ⊂ X such that cl({λX ; λ ∈ [0, ε], X ∈ ker(pi)} ∩ U) is compact. As a result, we can apply
Corollary 1.61 in Barbu and Precupanu (2012) to conclude that A + ker(pi) is closed. Proposition 4.1 now
yields that E(X) 6= ∅ for every X ∈ X .
Remark 4.3. Optimal payoffs are called risk allocations in the setting of multivariate shortfall risk measures
studied by Armenti et al. (2016). The main existence result is their Theorem 3.6, which provides a sufficient
condition for the existence of risk allocations under a suitable assumption on the underlying multivariate
loss function. This assumption is easily seen to be equivalent to the absence of scalable good deals.
We apply the preceding proposition to star-shaped and polyhedral acceptance sets. First, we show that
optimal payoffs always exist if the underlying acceptance set is star-shaped and the market does not admit
good deals. Due to Assumption 2, this result applies to any convex or conic acceptance set.
Corollary 4.4. Assume A is star-shaped and the market admits no good deals, i.e. A∩ker(pi) = {0}. Then,
we have E(X) 6= ∅ for every X ∈ X .
Proof. It is not difficult to verify that any star-shaped set that is closed contains its asymptotic cone. As a
result, the assertion follows at once from Proposition 4.2.
Next, we show that every position admits optimal payoffs whenever the underlying acceptance set is poly-
hedral. In this case, we need not require the absence of (scalable) good deals.
Corollary 4.5. Assume A is polyhedral. Then, we have E(X) 6= ∅ for every X ∈ X .
Proof. The assertion follows from Proposition 4.1 once we prove that A+ker(pi) is closed. In fact, we show
that A+ker(pi) is even polyhedral. This is clear if dim(X ) <∞ since, being a finite-dimensional space, ker(pi)
is polyhedral in a finite-dimensional setting and polyhedrality is preserved under addition. Hence, assume
that dim(X ) =∞ and note that we may suppose without loss of generality that dim(ker(pi)) = 1 (otherwise
proceed by a simple finite induction argument). We also assume that A is represented by ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ X ′+.
In view of Lemma 2.1, this means that
A =
m⋂
i=1
{X ∈ X ; ϕi(X) ≥ σA(ϕi)}.
In this case, we readily have
A∞ =
m⋂
i=1
{X ∈ X ; ϕi(X) ≥ 0}.
First, suppose that A∞ ∩ ker(pi) 6= {0} and take a nonzero Z ∈ A∞ ∩ ker(pi). Note that Z ∈ bd(A∞), for
otherwise every X ∈ X would admit λ > 0 satisfying λX + Z ∈ A∞, so that X ⊂ A∞ + ker(pi) (in contrast
to the finiteness of ρ, see the discussion before Proposition 2.4). Since Z is a boundary point of A∞, one
can split {1, . . . ,m} into two subsets I0 6= ∅ and I+ such that
ϕi(Z) = 0 for i ∈ I0 and ϕi(Z) > 0 for i ∈ I+.
In this case, we claim that
A+ ker(pi) =
⋂
i∈I0
{X ∈ X ; ϕi(X) ≥ σA(ϕi)}.
The inclusion “⊂” is clear. To show the converse inclusion, assume that X ∈ X satisfies ϕi(X) ≥ σA(ϕi)
for all i ∈ I0 and note that we may always choose λ > 0 large enough to satisfy
ϕi(X + λZ) =
{
ϕi(X) ≥ σA(ϕi) if i ∈ I0,
ϕi(X) + λϕi(Z) ≥ σA(ϕi) if i ∈ I+,
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so that X ∈ A+ ker(pi). This proves the inclusion “⊃” and shows that A+ ker(pi) is polyhedral.
Now, suppose that A∞ ∩ ker(pi) = {0}. Take any nonzero Z ∈ ker(pi) and note that ϕj(Z) > 0 > ϕk(Z)
for suitable j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (otherwise either Z or −Z would need to belong to A∞). Hence, we may split
{1, . . . ,m} into three subsets I0, I+ 6= ∅ and I− 6= ∅ such that
ϕi(Z) = 0 for i ∈ I0, ϕi(Z) > 0 for i ∈ I+, ϕi(Z) < 0 for i ∈ I−.
For any j ∈ I+ and k ∈ I− define λjk = −
ϕk(Z)
ϕj(Z)
> 0 so that the functional ϕjk = λjkϕj + ϕk belongs to
ker(pi)⊥. We claim that
A+ ker(pi) =
⋂
i∈I0
{X ∈ X ; ϕi(X) ≥ σA(ϕi)} ∩
⋂
j∈I+, k∈I−
{X ∈ X ; ϕjk(X) ≥ σA(ϕjk)}.
The inclusion “⊂” is clear. To prove the converse inclusion, take X ∈ X and assume it belongs to the above
finite intersection. We have to exhibit λ ∈ R such that X + λZ ∈ A, or equivalently ϕi(X + λZ) ≥ σA(ϕi)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. To this effect, set
λ = max
i∈I+
σA(ϕi)− ϕi(X)
ϕi(Z)
.
Then, it is not difficult to verify that
ϕi(X + λZ) =


ϕi(X) ≥ σA(ϕi) if i ∈ I0,
ϕi(X) + λϕi(Z) ≥ ϕi(X) +
σA(ϕi)−ϕi(X)
ϕi(Z)
ϕi(Z) = σA(ϕi) if i ∈ I+,
ϕji(X)− λjiϕj(X + λZ) ≥ λjiσA(ϕj) + σA(ϕi)− λjiσA(ϕj) = σA(ϕi) if i ∈ I−,
where j ∈ I+ satisfies λ =
σA(ϕj)−ϕj(X)
ϕj(Z)
(note that ϕj(X + λZ) = σA(ϕj)). This concludes the proof of the
inclusion “⊃” and shows that A+ ker(pi) is polyhedral.
Uniqueness of optimal payoffs
After characterizing the existence of optimal payoffs, the next natural question is under which conditions
we can ensure uniqueness. We start by showing a general characterization of uniqueness, which is a simple
consequence of the definition of our optimal payoff map. Here, forX ∈ X we denote by |E(X)| the cardinality
of the set E(X).
Proposition 4.6. Assume E(X) 6= ∅ for every X ∈ X . Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) |E(X)| = 1 for every X ∈ X .
(b) |E(X)| = 1 for every X ∈ bdA∩ bd (A+ ker(pi)).
(c) bdA∩ bd (A+ ker(pi)) ∩ (bdA+ (ker(pi) \ {0})) = ∅.
(d) bdA∩ (bdA+ (ker(pi) \ {0})) ⊂ int(A+ ker(pi)).
Proof. It is clear that (a) implies (b). Now, assume that (b) holds but we find X ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A + ker(pi))
and Z ∈ ker(pi) \ {0} such that X + Z ∈ bdA. Since ρ(X) = 0 by Lemma 3.1, we see that E(X) contains
both the null payoff 0 ∈ M and the nonzero payoff Z ∈ M so that |E(X)| ≥ 2. Since this contradicts (b),
we conclude that (b) must imply (c).
It is immediate to verify that (c) implies (d). Finally, assume that condition (d) is satisfied but there exist
Z1, Z2 ∈ E(X) with Z1 6= Z2 for some X ∈ X . In particular, note that Z2 − Z1 ∈ ker(pi) \ {0}. Since
Proposition 3.2 implies that X + Z1 ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A+ ker(pi)), it follows that
X + Z2 = X + Z1 + Z2 − Z1 ∈ ((bdA∩ bd(A+ ker(pi))) + ker(pi) \ {0}) ∩ bdA.
However, this is incompatible with condition (d), showing that (d) implies (a).
We provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness in the case of a polyhedral acceptance set. To this effect, we
freely use the dual representation of polyhedral sets recorded in Lemma 2.1.
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Proposition 4.7. Assume A is polyhedral and is represented by ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ X ′+. For any X ∈ X consider
the set
IA(X) = {i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ; ϕi(X) = σA(ϕi)}.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) |E(X)| = 1 for every X ∈ X .
(b) ker(pi) ∩
⋂
i∈IA(X)
ker(ψi) = {0} for every X ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A+ ker(pi)).
Proof. First of all, recall from Corollary 4.5 that every position admits an optimal payoff so that E(X)
is nonempty for all X ∈ X . In addition, note that for any position X ∈ X we have IA(X) 6= ∅ if and
only if X ∈ bdA due to polyhedrality. To prove that (a) implies (b), assume that condition (b) fails for
X ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A + ker(pi)) so that we find a nonzero Z ∈ ker(pi) that belongs to ker(ϕi) for all i ∈ IA(X).
In particular, note that
ϕi(X + λZ) = ϕi(X) + λϕi(Z) = σA(ϕi) for i ∈ IA(X)
for every λ ∈ (0,∞). Since ϕi(X) > σA(ϕi) for i /∈ IA(X), it is also clear that
ϕi(X + λZ) = ϕi(X) + λϕi(Z) ≥ σA(ϕi) for i /∈ IA(X)
for λ ∈ (0,∞) small enough. This implies that X + λZ ∈ A for λ ∈ (0,∞) small enough. Since ρ(X) = 0,
we conclude that |E(X)| > 1. This establishes that (a) implies (b).
Conversely, assume that (a) does not hold so that |E(X)| > 1 for some X ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A + ker(pi)) by
Proposition 4.6. Take two distinct Z1, Z2 ∈ E(X) and set Y = X +
1
2 (Z1 + Z2). Since
1
2 (Z1 + Z2) ∈ E(X)
by convexity of A, it follows from Proposition 3.2 that Y belongs to bdA∩bd(A+ker(pi)). Then, for every
i ∈ IA(Y ) we have
σA(ϕi) ≤
{
ϕi(X + Z1) = ϕi(Y ) +
1
2ϕi(Z1 − Z2) = σA(ϕi) +
1
2ϕi(Z1 − Z2)
ϕi(X + Z2) = ϕi(Y ) +
1
2ϕi(Z2 − Z1) = σA(ϕi) +
1
2ϕi(Z2 − Z1)
where we used that both X + Z1 and X + Z2 belong to A in the first inequality. This implies that
Z1 − Z2 ∈ ker(ϕi) for all i ∈ IA(Y ). Since pi(Z1 − Z2) = ρ(X)− ρ(X) = 0, we conclude that condition (b)
is violated. It follows that (b) implies (a).
The above condition for uniqueness takes the following simple form for acceptance sets that are polyhedral
cones.
Corollary 4.8. Assume A is a polyhedral cone represented by ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ X ′+ and
ker(pi) ∩ ker(ϕi) = {0} for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Then, |E(X)| = 1 for every X ∈ X .
We conclude this section by establishing another useful result on uniqueness, which states that uniqueness
is always ensured whenever the acceptance set is “strictly convex” along the directions of ker(pi).
Proposition 4.9. Assume E(X) 6= ∅ for all X ∈ X and for any distinct X,Y ∈ bdA with X − Y ∈ ker(pi)
there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying λX + (1− λ)Y ∈ intA. Then, |E(X)| = 1 for all X ∈ X .
Proof. Take any position X ∈ bdA∩ (bdA+ker(pi) \ {0}). The claim follows directly from Proposition 4.6
once we show that X belongs to int(A+ker(pi)). To this effect, note that X = Y +Z for a suitable position
Y ∈ bdA and a nonzero payoff Z ∈ ker(pi). Hence, by assumption, we find a scalar λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
λX + (1 − λ)Y ∈ intA. Now, set for convenience
M = X − (1− λ)Z = λX + (1− λ)Y ∈ intA,
so that M + U ⊂ A for some neighborhood of zero U ⊂ X . Since every W ∈ X + U is easily seen to satisfy
W − (1− λ)Z −M =W −X ∈ U , it follows that
X + U ⊂ (1− λ)Z +M + U ⊂ A+ ker(pi).
This shows that X is an interior point of A+ ker(pi) and concludes the proof.
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Remark 4.10. The above sufficient condition for uniqueness is, in general, not necessary. To see this, let
X = R3 and consider the polyhedral acceptance set given by
A = co({X1, X2, X3}) + X+
where X1 = (0,−1, 1), X2 = (−1, 0, 1), and X3 = (− 12 , 0, 0). Assume that M = X and define pi by setting
pi(X) = 13 (X1 +X2 +X3) for all X ∈ X . It is immediate to verify that our assumptions (A1) to (A3) are
all satisfied in this setting. Moreover, since
A+ ker(pi) = {X ∈ X ; X1 +X2 +X3 ≥ −
1
2},
it follows that E(X) is nonempty by Proposition 4.1 and is easily seen to consist of a single payoff due
to Proposition 4.6 for every X ∈ X . However, the positions X1 and X2 both belong to bdA and satisfy
X1 −X2 ∈ ker(pi) \ {0} and the entire segment connecting X1 and X2 lie in bdA.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 4.9, we infer that a position admits at most one optimal payoff if the
underlying acceptance set is strictly convex.
Corollary 4.11. Assume A is strictly convex and E(X) 6= ∅ for all X ∈ X . Then, |E(X)| = 1 for all
X ∈ X .
Remark 4.12. In the multivariate setting of Armenti et al. (2016), the uniqueness of optimal payoffs is
crucial to define a meaningful allocation of systemic risk across the entities of the financial system under
investigation. The uniqueness result recorded in their Theorem 3.6 can be seen to be equivalent to the strict
convexity of the underlying acceptance set.
5 Stability of optimal payoffs
The remainder of the paper focuses on the question of stability or robustness of optimal portfolios. As men-
tioned in the introduction, from an operational perspective it is critical to ensure that a slight perturbation
of X , arising for instance from estimation or specification errors, does not alter the set of optimal payoffs in
a significant way. In other words, for all positions X,Y ∈ X we would like to ensure that
Y is close to X =⇒ E(Y ) is “close” to E(X).
In order to specify a notion of proximity between sets of optimal payoffs we are naturally led to investigate the
(semi)continuity properties of the optimal payoff map. A variety of (semi)continuity notions for set-valued
maps have been investigated in the literature and the same terminology is often used to capture different
forms of continuity. The notions of upper and lower semicontinuity go back to Berge (1963), but our notion
of upper semicontinuity is slightly different and aligned with that of upper hemicontinuity in Aliprantis and
Border (2006). The notion of outer semicontinuity is taken from Rockafellar and Wets (2009).
Outer semicontinuity. For any given position X ∈ X we say that E is outer semicontinuous at X if for
every Z /∈ E(X) we find open neighborhoods UX ⊂ X of X and UZ ⊂M of Z such that
Y ∈ UX =⇒ E(Y ) ∩ UZ = ∅.
We say that E is outer semicontinuous (on X ) if E is outer semicontinuous at every X ∈ X . This stability
property requires that an eligible payoff that is non-optimal for a given position cannot be optimal for any
position that is sufficiently close to the given one.
Upper semicontinuity. For any given position X ∈ X we say that E is upper semicontinuous at X if for
every open set U ⊂M with E(X) ⊂ U we find an open neighborhood UX ⊂ X of X such that
Y ∈ UX =⇒ E(Y ) ⊂ U .
We say that E is upper semicontinuous (on X ) if E is upper semicontinuous at every X ∈ X . Intuitively
speaking, upper semicontinuity ensures that the set of optimal payoffs does not suddenly “explode” as a
result of a slight perturbation of the underlying position.
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Lower semicontinuity. For a position X ∈ X we say that E is lower (or inner) semicontinuous at X if
for every open set U ⊂M with E(X) ∩ U 6= ∅ we find an open neighborhood UX ⊂ X of X such that
Y ∈ UX =⇒ E(Y ) ∩ U 6= ∅.
We say that E is lower (or inner) semicontinuous (on X ) if E is lower semicontinuous at every X ∈ X .
Intuitively speaking, lower semicontinuity ensures that the set of optimal payoffs does not suddenly “shrink”
as a result of a slight perturbation of the underlying position. In this case, for every position X the following
intuitive robustness property is satisfied:
Y is close to X and Z ∈ E(X) =⇒ there exists a payoff in E(Y ) that is close to Z.
In other words, lower semicontinuity guarantees that an optimal payoff remains close to being optimal after
a small perturbation of the underlying position. This continuity property therefore constitutes the key
stability notion in our financial context.
Remark 5.1. (i) Since E is closed valued, it is immediate to see that upper semicontinuity always implies
outer semicontinuity for our optimal payoff map E .
(ii) Consider a position X ∈ X with |E(X)| = 1. Then, E is lower semicontinuous at X whenever it is upper
semicontinuous at X . The converse is, however, not true. But if |E(X)| = 1 for all X ∈ X , then upper and
lower semicontinuity are equivalent and boil down to the continuity of the map assigning to X the unique
element in E(X).
(iii) For set-valued maps that are convex valued, the property of lower semicontinuity is especially powerful
because it ensures the existence of continuous selections; see Theorem 17.66 in Aliprantis and Border (2009).
Recall that a function ζ : X →M is a selection of E if it satisfies ζ(X) ∈ E(X) for every X ∈ X such that
E(X) is nonempty. A continuous selection for the optimal payoff map can be therefore interpreted as a
procedure to select optimal payoffs in a robust way.
Outer semicontinuity
We start by showing that the optimal payoff map is always outer semicontinuous on the whole of X .
Theorem 5.2. The optimal payoff map E is outer semicontinuous.
Proof. Take an arbitrary X ∈ X and fix Z ∈ X \ E(X). Assume first that Z /∈M. In this case, since M is
closed, we find a neighborhood UZ ⊂M of Z satisfying UZ ∩M = ∅, which implies E(Y )∩UZ = ∅ for every
Y ∈ X . Assume now that Z ∈ M but X + Z /∈ A. Since A is closed, there exist neighborhoods UX ⊂ X of
X and UZ ⊂ M of Z such that (UX + UZ) ∩ A = ∅. In particular, we must have E(Y ) ∩ UZ = ∅ for every
Y ∈ UX . Finally, assume that Z ∈ M and X + Z ∈ A but pi(Z) 6= ρ(X). In this case, set
ε = 14 |pi(Z)− ρ(X)|
and consider the neighborhoods of X and Z defined, respectively, by (recall that ρ and pi are continuous)
UX = {Y ∈ X ; |ρ(Y )− ρ(X)| < ε} and UZ = {W ∈ M ; |pi(W )− pi(Z)| < ε}.
Then, taking any element W ∈ E(Y ) ∩ UZ with Y ∈ UX we obtain
ε ≤ 14 |pi(Z)− pi(W )|+
1
4 |pi(W )− ρ(X)| =
1
4 |pi(Z)− pi(W )|+
1
4 |ρ(Y )− ρ(X)| <
1
4ε+
1
4ε =
1
2ε,
which is clearly impossible. This shows that E(Y ) ∩ UZ = ∅ must hold for every Y ∈ UX . In conclusion, it
follows that E is always outer semicontinuous at X .
Upper semicontinuity
This section provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal payoff map to be upper semicon-
tinuous. We start by proving a sequential characterization of upper semicontinuity based on the general
characterization recorded in Theorem 17.20 in Aliprantis and Border (2006). By exploiting the special
structure of the optimal payoff map, we can sharpen that result and show that upper semicontinuity can
be charaterized in terms of sequences without any compactness assumption. In fact, upper semicontinuity
always implies compact-valuedness.
16
Proposition 5.3. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) E is upper semicontinuous.
(b) E(K) is bounded (in M) for every compact set K ⊂ X .
(c) For every X ∈ X we have
Xn → X, Zn ∈ E(Xn) =⇒ ∃Z ∈ E(X), ∃(Znk) : Znk → Z.
Proof. First of all, assume that (a) holds. Recall from Lemma 17.8 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) that any
upper semicontinuous set-valued map that is compact valued automatically sends compact sets into bounded
sets. Since E is closed valued by Proposition 3.2, assertion (b) follows once we prove that E(X) is bounded
(in M) for any given X ∈ X . To this effect, assume that E(X) 6= ∅ and consider the open neighborhood of
E(X) in M defined by
U =
⋃
Z∈E(X)∩B1(0)
intB1(Z) ∪
⋃
r>1
⋃
Z∈E(X)∩bdBr(0)
intB 1
r
(Z).
Moreover, consider the strictly-increasing function f : (1,∞) → (2,∞) given by f(r) = r + 1
r
. Note that
for every W ∈ U with ‖W‖ > 2 we find suitable r > 1 and Z ∈ E(X) ∩ bdBr(0) such that W ∈ intB 1
r
(Z),
which implies ‖W‖ ≤ ‖Z‖+ ‖W − Z‖ ≤ f(r) and yields
‖W − Z‖ ≤
1
r
≤
1
f−1(‖W‖)
.
As a result, it follows that
W ∈ U \ B2(0) =⇒ d({W}, E(X)) ≤
1
f−1(‖W‖)
. (6)
By upper semicontinuity there exists an open neighborhood UX ⊂ X of X such that E(Y ) ⊂ U for all
Y ∈ UX . In particular, we find ε > 0 small enough so that X + εU ∈ UX and thus
E(X)− εU = E(X + εU) ⊂ U . (7)
We claim that
d(E(X)− εU, E(X)) > 0. (8)
To see this, take any Z,W ∈ E(X) and note that, since pi(Z) = ρ(X) = pi(W ), we have Z −W ∈ ker(pi).
This yields
‖Z − εU −W‖ ≥ εd({U}, ker(pi)) > 0,
establishing (8) (the last inequality holds by continuity of pi because pi(U) > 0). By combining (6), (7)
and (8), we conclude that E(X) must be bounded. Indeed, if this were not the case, we could find by (7) an
unbounded sequence (Zn) ⊂ E(X)− εU ⊂ U satisfying
d({Zn}, E(X)) ≤
1
f−1(‖Zn‖)
→ 0
by (6). However, this would contradict (8). In conclusion, it follows that E(X) is bounded and, thus, (b)
holds.
Next, assume that (b) holds and consider a sequence (Xn) ⊂ X and X ∈ X such that Xn → X . Moreover,
let Zn ∈ E(Xn) be fixed for each n ∈ N. Since, being convergent, (Xn) is contained in a compact set, it
follows from (a) that (Zn) is bounded and therefore admits a convergent subsequence (Znk). Let Z ∈ M
be the corresponding limit (note that M is closed). Since Xnk +Znk ∈ bdA∩ bd(A+ ker(pi)) for all k ∈ N
by Proposition 3.2, we easily infer that X + Z ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A + ker(pi)) as well. Hence, we can apply
Proposition 3.2 to conclude that Z ∈ E(X). This establishes (c). We complete the proof of the equivalence
by recalling that (c) always implies (a) due to Theorem 17.20 in Aliprantis and Border (2006).
The next result shows that E is always upper semicontinuous whenever the market for the eligible assets
admits no scalable good deals.
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Corollary 5.4. Assume the market admits no scalable good deals, i.e. A∞∩ker(pi) = {0}. Then, E is upper
semicontinuous.
Proof. The claim follows from Proposition 5.3 once we show that, for any fixed compact set K ⊂ X , the
set E(K) is bounded (in M). By way of contrast, assume that E(K) is not bounded so that we find a
sequence (Xn) ⊂ K and elements Zn ∈ E(Xn) for n ∈ N such that ‖Zn‖ ≥ n for every n ∈ N. Without
loss of generality we assume that Xn → X for some X ∈ K. Note that, by compactness, we can extract a
suitable subsequence (Znk) such that
1
‖Znk‖
(Znk)→ Z for some nonzero Z ∈ M (recall that M is closed).
In particular, we also have
1
‖Znk‖
(Xnk + Znk)→ Z.
Since Xnk + Znk ∈ A for all k ∈ N, we see that Z ∈ A
∞. Moreover, Z satisfies
pi(Z) = lim
k→∞
pi(Znk)
‖Znk‖
= lim
k→∞
ρ(Xnk)
‖Znk‖
= 0
by continuity. However, in contrast to our assumption, this implies that Z ∈ A∞ ∩ ker(pi). It follows that
E(K) must be bounded, concluding the proof.
The absence of scalable good deals is a necessary condition for upper semicontinuity whenever the underlying
acceptance set is star-shaped. In this case, upper semicontinuity is equivalent to E(X) being bounded for
some position X ∈ X (such that E(X) is nonempty). Recall that, by Assumption 2, A is automatically
star-shaped when convex.
Theorem 5.5. Assume A is star-shaped. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) E is upper semicontinuous.
(b) E(X) is bounded for every X ∈ X .
(c) E(X) is bounded for some X ∈ X such that E(X) 6= ∅.
(d) The market admits no scalable good deals, i.e. A∞ ∩ ker(pi) = {0}.
Proof. It follows immediately from Proposition 5.3 that (a) implies (b), which clearly implies (c). Moreover,
Corollary 5.4 tells us that (d) implies (a). Hence, it suffices to show that A∞ ∩ ker(pi) = {0} whenever
E is bounded valued at some position that admits optimal payoffs. To this effect, take any X ∈ X such
that E(X) is nonempty and bounded. In this case, we must have A∞ ∩ ker(pi) = E(X)∞ = {0} due to
Proposition 3.2 and this concludes the proof of the equivalence.
Lower semicontinuity
In this section we focus on the stability notion that, as discussed above, is most relevant in our framework.
We start by highlighting that lower semicontinuity can be equivalently stated in terms of sequences. In
addition, we show that lower semicontinuity is automatically ensured for all positions once it holds at every
point belonging to the intersection between the boundary of A and the boundary of the “augmented”
acceptance set A+ ker(pi), which coincides with the set where ρ is zero.
Proposition 5.6. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) E is lower semicontinuous at every X ∈ X .
(b) E is lower semicontinuous at every X ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A+ ker(pi)).
(c) For every X ∈ X we have
Xn → X, Z ∈ E(X) =⇒ ∃Zn ∈ E(Xn) : Zn → Z.
(d) For every X ∈ X we have
Xn → X, Z ∈ E(X) =⇒ ∃Znk ∈ E(Xnk) : Znk → Z.
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Proof. It is clear that (a) implies (b) and that (c) implies (d). Moreover, [1, Theorem 17.21] asserts that (a)
and (d) are always equivalent. Hence, it remains to prove that (b) implies (c). To this end, assume that (b)
holds and consider arbitrary (Xn) ⊂ X and X ∈ X satisfying Xn → X . In addition, take any Z ∈ E(X).
Assume first that X ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A + ker(pi)). In this case, for any k ∈ N set Uk = intB 1
k
(Z) and note
that E(X) ∩ Uk 6= ∅. Since E is lower semicontinuous at X by assumption, it follows that for any k ∈ N
there exists a neighborhood Vk ⊂ X of X such that E(Y ) ∩ Uk 6= ∅ for all Y ∈ Vk. Observe that, by taking
subsequent intersections, we may assume without loss of generality that Vk+1 ⊂ Vk for every k ∈ N. In
addition, for each k ∈ N there exists n(k) ∈ N such that Xn ∈ Vk for all n ≥ n(k). In line with our previous
assumption, we may always ensure that n(k + 1) > n(k) for every k ∈ N. As a result, for every n ∈ N we
can select a payoff Zn ∈ E(Xn) in such a way that Zn ∈ Uk whenever n ∈ [n(k), n(k + 1)) for some k ∈ N
(if n < n(1) we take an arbitrary Zn ∈ E(Xn)). It is not difficult to verify that Zn → Z, so that (c) holds.
If otherwise X /∈ bdA∩ bd(A+ker(pi)), it suffices to define Yn = Xn+Z for all n ∈ N and Y = X +Z and
observe that X + Z ∈ bdA ∩ bd(A+ ker(pi)) and
0 = Z − Z ∈ E(X)− Z = E(X + Z)
by virtue of Proposition 3.2. At this point, one can apply the preceding argument to find Wn ∈ E(Xn + Z)
for all n ∈ N such that Wn → 0. But then Wn + Z ∈ E(Xn) for every n ∈ N and Wn + Z → Z, showing
that (b) holds also in this case.
Remark 5.7 (On Assumption 3). The main objective of this paper is the study of lower semicontinuity
of the optimal payoff map. It follows from the preceding proposition that a necessary condition for our
question to be meaningful is that ρ is finite and continuous. Indeed, it is not difficult to see that E cannot
be lower semicontinuous at any position X ∈ X for which E(X) 6= ∅ unless ρ is finite and continuous there.
This explains why we have to work under Assumption 3.
Remark 5.8 (On sufficient conditions for lower semicontinuity). As already mentioned in the in-
troduction, general sufficient conditions for lower semicontinuity are typically hard to establish; see Bank
et al. (1983) and the references therein. Some well-known conditions are the following (a definition of strict
lower semicontinuity is given before Lemma 5.18):
(i) There exist a strictly lower semicontinuous map S1 : X ⇒ M and a lower semicontinuous map
S2 : X ⇒M such that E(X) = S1(X) ∩ S2(X) for all X ∈ X ; see Lemma 2.2.5 in Bank et al. (1983).
(ii) The lower section {X ∈ X ; Z ∈ E(X)} is open for all Z ∈ M; see Lemma 17.12 in Aliprantis and
Border (2006).
(iii) The graph {(X,Z) ∈ X ×M ; Z ∈ E(X)} is convex; see Theorem 5.9 in Rockafellar and Wets (2009).
Unfortunately, as is not difficult to verify, the above conditions are generally not satisfied in our framework.
The natural choices for S1 and S2 in (i) are given by
S1(X) = {Z ∈ M ; X + Z ∈ A} and S2(X) = {Z ∈M ; pi(Z) = ρ(X)}.
However, neither S1 nor S2 can be strictly lower semicontinuous. Condition (ii) is also clearly never satisfied.
For condition (iii) to be fulfilled, ρ must be linear along any segment, i.e. for all X,Y ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1] we
must have ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) = λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(Y ). In the common case where ρ(0) = 0, this would force
ρ to be linear on the entire space X , a condition that is seldom satisfied if M is a strict subspace of X .
Lower semicontinuity for polyhedral acceptance sets
In this section we prove that lower semicontinuity of the optimal payoff map always holds if the underlying
acceptance set is polyhedral. We start by establishing two useful lemmas. The first simple result highlights
a useful property of points of the boundary of A (we provide a proof since we were unable to find an explicit
reference). Here, we denote by riC the relative interior of a set C ⊂ X , i.e. the set of all X ∈ C that admit
a neighborhood UX ⊂ X satisfying UX ∩ aff C ⊂ C.
Lemma 5.9. Assume A is polyhedral and is represented by ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ X ′+. For any X ∈ X define
IA(X) = {i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ; ϕi(X) = σA(ϕi)} .
Then, for every nonempty convex subset C ⊂ bdA the following statements hold:
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(i) If X ∈ ri C and Y ∈ C, then IA(X) ⊂ IA(Y ).
(ii) If X,Y ∈ ri C, then IA(X) = IA(Y ).
Proof. Take any X ∈ riC and Y ∈ C. It is clear that X ± ε(Y −X) ∈ C for ε > 0 small enough. Then, for
any i ∈ IA(X), we have
σA(ϕi)± εϕi(Y −X) = ϕi(X ± ε(Y −X)) ≥ σA(ϕi) ,
which is only possible if ϕi(Y ) = ϕi(X). This yields i ∈ IA(Y ) and shows that (i) holds. Assertion (ii) is a
direct consequence of (i).
The second preliminary result provides a decomposition of the optimal payoff map in the polyhedral case,
which is the key ingredient when establishing lower semicontinuity. Recall that a point X of a convex set
C ⊂ X is said to be an extreme point of C whenever C \ {X} is still convex. Recall also that any polyhedral
set admits at most finitely many extreme points; see Lemma 7.78 in Aliprantis and Border (2006).
Lemma 5.10. Assume A is polyhedral. Then, there exists C : X ⇒M such that C(X) 6= ∅ and
E(X) = (A∞ ∩ ker(pi)) + C(X)
for every X ∈ X and such that C(K) is bounded for every compact set K ⊂ X .
Proof. LetX ∈ X be fixed and recall from Proposition 3.2 that, sinceA is polyhedral, E(X) is also polyhedral
(inM). We denote by C(X) the convex hull of the set of the extreme points of the polyhedral set E(X)∩N ,
where N is any vector subspace of M satisfying lin E(X) ∩ N = {0}. Note that N does not depend on the
choice of X by virtue of Proposition 3.2. Moreover, note that, by construction, E(X) ∩ N does not contain
any vector subspace and, thus, does admit extreme points. Now, it follows from Lemmas 16.2 and 16.3 in
Barvinok (2002) that E(X) can be decomposed as
E(X) = E(X)∞ + C(X) .
In view of Proposition 3.2, we can equivalently write
E(X) = (A∞ ∩ ker(pi)) + C(X) .
It remains to prove that C maps compact sets into bounded sets. To this effect, assume that A is represented
by ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ X ′+ and define for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m+2} the maps αi : N → R and βi : X → R by setting
αi(Z) =


ϕi(Z) if i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
pi(Z) if i = m+ 1,
−pi(Z) if i = m+ 2,
and βi(X) =


σA(ϕi)− ϕi(X) if i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
ρ(X) if i = m+ 1,
−ρ(X) if i = m+ 2.
Then, it follows from (3) and (4) that the polyhedral set E(X) ∩N can be expressed as
E(X) ∩ N =
m+2⋂
i=1
{Z ∈ N ; αi(Z) ≥ βi(X)}
for every X ∈ X . Now, denote by I the collection of all subsets I ⊂ {1, . . . ,m+2} consisting of d = dimN
elements and such that {αi ; i ∈ I} is linearly independent. The collection I is nonempty by virtue of
Proposition 3.3.3 in Bertsekas et al. (2003). Moreover, define αI : N → Rd and βI : X → Rd by setting
αI(Z) = (αi1 (Z), . . . , αid(Z)) and βI(X) = (βi1(X), . . . , βid(X))
for every I = {i1, . . . , id} ∈ I and note that αI is linear and bijective and βI is continuous (due to the
continuity of ρ) for every I ∈ I. As a result of Proposition 3.3.3 in Bertsekas et al. (2003), every extreme
point of E(X) ∩ N , with X ∈ X , has the form α−1I (βI(X)) for some I ∈ I. This implies that, for any
compact set K ⊂ X , we have
C(K) ⊂ co
(⋃
I∈I
α−1I (βI(K))
)
.
Note that α−1I (βI(K)) is compact for every choice of I ∈ I. Since I contains finitely many members and
the convex hull of a compact set is still compact, we conclude that C(K) is contained in a compact set. This
establishes that C(K) is bounded and concludes the proof.
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We are now ready to prove that lower semicontinuity always holds if the underlying acceptance set is
polyhedral.
Theorem 5.11. Assume A is polyhedral. Then, E is lower semicontinuous.
Proof. We assume throughout that A is represented by ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ X ′+. Take X ∈ X and consider a
sequence (Xn) ⊂ X converging to X and Z ∈ E(X). Let (Zn) ⊂M be any sequence satisfying Zn ∈ C(Xn)
for every n ∈ N, where C : X ⇒M is the set-valued map from Lemma 5.10. Since (Xn) is contained in a
compact set, Lemma 5.10 tells us that (Zn) is bounded. Hence, passing to a suitable subsequence which we
still denote by (Zn), we have Zn →W for some payoffW ∈M. Note that Xn+Zn → X+W and Xn+Zn ∈
bdA∩bd(A+ker(pi)) for all n ∈ N by Proposition 3.2. Hence, we infer that X+W ∈ bdA∩bd(A+ker(pi))
or, equivalently, W ∈ E(X) again by Proposition 3.2.
Recall from Corollary 4.5 that E(X) 6= ∅. If |E(X)| = 1, then we must have W = Z and we immediately
conclude that E is lower semicontinuous at X by virtue of Proposition 5.6. Hence, let us assume that
|E(X)| > 1. In this case, being convex, E(X) has nonempty relative interior.
We first assume that Z ∈ riE(X). Since X + Z ∈ ri(X + E(X)) and X + W ∈ X + E(X) and since
X + E(X) ⊂ bdA by Proposition 3.2, we infer from Lemma 5.9 that
IA(X + Z) ⊂ IA(X +W ) .
This, in particular, implies that
IA(X + Z) ⊂ {i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ; ϕi(Z −W ) = 0} .
For i ∈ IA(X + Z) we can use the above inclusion to obtain (note that Xn + Zn ∈ A for all n ∈ N)
ϕi(Xn + Zn + Z −W ) = ϕi(Xn + Zn) ≥ σA(ϕi)
for every n ∈ N. For i 6∈ IA(X + Z) we immediately see that
ϕi(Xn + Zn + Z −W ) = ϕi(Xn + Zn −X −W ) + ϕi(X + Z) > σA(ϕi)
for n large enough since ϕi(Xn + Zn − X −W ) → 0. By combining the above inequalities we infer that
Xn + Zn + Z −W ∈ A for n large enough. Now, set Wn = Zn + Z −W for every n ∈ N and note that
Wn → Z. Moreover, we eventually have Xn +Wn ∈ A and
pi(Wn) = pi(Zn) + pi(Z)− pi(W ) = ρ(Xn) + ρ(X)− ρ(X) = ρ(Xn) .
In other words, the sequence (Wn) ⊂M satisfies Wn ∈ E(Xn) for n large enough and Wn → Z. This shows
that E is lower semicontinuous at X by Proposition 5.6.
Assume now that Z /∈ riE(X). In this case, we may approximate Z by elements in the relative interior of
E(X) and apply the above argument to each of them. It then follows from Proposition 5.6 that E is lower
semicontinuous at X also in this case.
Recall that acceptance sets based on Expected Shortfall or Test Scenarios are polyhedral in a finite-
dimensional setting. Hence, the following corollary is a direct consequence of our general result on polyhedral
acceptance sets.
Corollary 5.12. Assume dim(X ) <∞ and A is based on either Expected Shortfall or Test Scenarios. Then,
E is lower semicontinuous
Lower semicontinuity for strictly-convex acceptance sets
The optimal payoff map is always lower semicontinuous if the chosen acceptance set is strictly convex. In
fact, any position admits a unique optimal payoff in that case and the map associating to each position its
optimal payoff is continuous.
Theorem 5.13. Assume A is strictly convex. Then, E is lower semicontinuous.
Proof. Recall that, by Corollary 4.11, every position admits at most one optimal payoff by strict convexity.
Hence, E is obviously bounded valued and Theorem 5.5 implies that E is upper semicontinuous. As a result,
we infer from Remark 5.1 that E is also lower semicontinuous.
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Counterexamples to lower semicontinuity
Example 5.14 (VaR-based acceptance sets). We show that, if acceptability is based on VaR, a slight
perturbation of a capital position may drastically reduce the range of optimal payoffs. In fact, the number
of choices of optimal payoffs could abruptly shrink from infinite to just one.
Fix α ∈
(
0, 13
)
(recall that values of α close to 0 are the interesting ones in practice) and consider a probability
space (Ω,F ,P) and a partition {E,F,G} ⊂ F of Ω satisfying P(E) = P(F ) = α and P(G) = 1 − 2α. Let
X = L∞(Ω,F ,P) and consider the VaR-based acceptance set
A = {X ∈ X ; P(X < 0) ≤ α}.
Moreover, takeM = span(1Ω, Z) for Z = 1E −1G and define pi by setting pi(1Ω) = 1 and pi(Z) = 0. Under
these specifications, Assumptions 1 to 3 are all satisfied.
Since A ∩ ker(pi) = {0} (the market admits no good deals), it follows from Corollary 4.4 that E(X) 6= ∅ for
all X ∈ X . It is not difficult to verify that ρ(0) = 0 and
E(0) = {λZ ; λ ∈ R, P(λZ < 0) ≤ α} = {λZ ; λ ∈ (−∞, 0]}.
Now, for each n ∈ N consider the position Xn = −
1
n
1F ∈ X and note that ρ(Xn) = 0, so that
E(Xn) = {λZ ; λ ∈ R, P(Xn + λZ < 0) ≤ α} = {0}.
Since we obviously have Xn → 0, we infer that E fails to be lower semicontinuous at 0. In particular, every
position Xn admits a unique optimal payoff whereas the limit position 0 allows for an infinity of optimal
payoffs.
The failure of lower semicontinuity we have just illustrated critically depends on the nonconvexity of VaR-
based acceptance sets. One may thus wonder whether the above extreme instability behaviour is also
possible if the chosen acceptance set is convex. Our next examples show that convexity is not sufficient to
ensure lower semicontinuity. In fact, the same extreme instability is compatible with a variety of important
(non-polyhedral) convex acceptance sets.
Example 5.15 (Scenario-based acceptance sets (in infinite dimension)). In a finite-dimensional
setting, acceptance sets based on Test Scenarios are polyhedral and the corresponding optimal payoff map is
thus lower semicontinuous by virtue of Theorem 5.11. This applies, in particular, to the positive cone. The
picture changes dramatically once we move to an infinite-dimensional setting, where polyhedrality ceases to
hold. In this case, we show that a slight perturbation of the underlying financial position may cause the set
of optimal payoffs to shrink from a rich infinite set to a mere singleton.
Consider a non-atomic probability space (Ω,F ,P) and fix an event E ∈ F with P(E) > 0. Let (Ek) ⊂ F
be a countable partition of E satisfying P(Ek) > 0 for all k ∈ N, which always exists by non-atomicity. We
work in the space X = L∞(Ω,F ,P), which is partially ordered by the canonical almost-sure ordering, and
consider the scenario-based acceptance set
A = {X ∈ X ; X1E ≥ 0}.
Moreover, we consider the space of eligible payoffs M = span(1Ω, Z), where
Z = −1E2 +
∑
k≥3
1
k
1Ek .
The pricing functional is defined by pi(1Ω) = 1 and pi(Z) = 0. Under these specifications, Assumptions 1 to
3 are all satisfied.
Since A ∩ ker(pi) = {0} (the market admits no good deals), Corollary 4.4 implies that E(X) 6= ∅ for all
X ∈ X . Now, fix γ ≥ 0 and define a position X ∈ X by setting
X = γ1E2 +
∑
k≥3
1
k
1Ek .
A direct computation shows that ρ(X) = 0. Moreover, it is not difficult to verify that
E(X) = {λZ ; λ ∈ R, (X + λZ)1E ≥ 0} = {λZ ; λ ∈ [−1, γ]}. (9)
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For any n ∈ N consider the position Xn ∈ X given by
Xn = γ1E2 +
2+n∑
k=3
1
k
1Ek +
∑
k≥3+n
1
k2
1Ek .
Note that for each n ∈ N we have
‖Xn −X‖∞ = sup
k≥3+n
‖(Xn −X)1Ek‖∞ = sup
k≥3+n
1
k
− 1
k2
< 13+n ,
which implies Xn → X . A direct computation shows that ρ(Xn) = 0 and
E(Xn) = {λZ ; λ ∈ R, (Xn + λZ)1E ≥ 0} = {λZ ; λ ∈ [0, γ]} (10)
for all n ∈ N. In particular, for any n ∈ N and λ ∈ R the inequality (Xn + λZ)1E ≥ 0 yields
λ ≥ sup
k≥3+n
{
− 1
k2
(
1
k
)−1}
= − inf
k≥3+n
1
k
= 0.
As a result, we see that E(Xn) = E(X1) for all n ∈ N. However, E(X) is strictly larger than E(X1). In
particular, E(X) is infinite whereas E(X1) consists of a single payoff if we choose γ = 0. This clearly shows
that E cannot be lower semicontinuous at X .
The next example shows that the failure of lower semicontinuity is the rule, rather than the exception, under
convex acceptance sets.
Example 5.16 (Convex law-invariant acceptance sets (in infinite dimension)). We work in the
setting of Example 5.15 and set E = Ω. Note that we can always choose the partition (Ek) ⊂ F so as to have
P(E1) > α. We consider the same space of eligible payoffs and a convex acceptance set A ⊂ X satisfying
Assumption 2 and such that
A ⊂ {X ∈ X ; ESα(X) ≤ 0} (11)
for some α ∈ (0, 1). This means that A is more stringent than some ES-based acceptance set. Note that,
since the space of eligible payoffs has not changed, Assumption 1 is clearly satisfied and Assumption 3 follows
from Proposition 2.4.
Of course, condition (11) holds for any acceptance sets based on ES. More generally, it follows by combining
Proposition 1.1 in Svindland (2010) and Theorem 4.67 in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011) that condition (11) is
fulfilled by any acceptance set A ⊂ X that is convex and law-invariant (X ∈ A for all X ∈ X having the
same probability distribution of some element of A) and that satisfies
A ⊂ {X ∈ X ; VaRα(X) ≤ 0}.
Since A ∩ ker(pi) = {0} (the market admits no good deals), Corollary 4.4 implies that E(X) 6= ∅ for all
X ∈ X . As a preliminary observation, take λ ∈ R and note that for any Y ∈ X with Y 1E1 = Z1E1 we have
ESα(Y + λZ)
{
= 0 if Y + λZ ≥ 0,
> 0 otherwise.
This is because P(Y + λZ = 0) ≥ P(E1) > α. Since X+ ⊂ A ⊂ {X ∈ X ; ESα(X) ≤ 0}, we infer that
Y + λZ ∈ A ⇐⇒ Y + λZ ≥ 0. (12)
Then, it follows from (9) that ρ(X) = 0 and
E(X) = {λZ ; λ ∈ R, X + λZ ∈ A} = {λZ ; λ ∈ [−1, γ]}.
Similarly, for any n ∈ N we infer from (10) that ρ(Xn) = 0 and
E(Xn) = {λZ ; λ ∈ R, Xn + λZ ∈ A} = {λZ ; λ ∈ [0, γ]}.
We can therefore argue as in Example 5.15 to conclude that E cannot be lower semicontinuous at X . In
particular, choosing γ = 0, we see that a small perturbation of X may cause the set of optimal payoffs to
abruptly shrink from an infinite set to just a singleton.
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Remark 5.17. With the exception of VaR-based acceptance sets, all the above examples cannot be adapted
to a finite-dimensional setting. In particular, Corollary 5.12 tells us that we always have lower semicontinuity
for acceptance sets based on ES and Test Scenarios in finite dimension. One may therefore wonder whether
convexity is capable of ensuring lower semicontinuity at least in a finite-dimensional setting. This is, however,
far from being true as shown in Baes and Munari (2017).
Lower semicontinuity of nearly-optimal payoff maps
The preceding examples show that, as soon as we depart from polyhedrality, the optimal payoff map may fail
to be lower semicontinuous, in which case the choice of the optimal portfolio is affected by severe instability.
This is irrespective of the underlying acceptance set being convex or not. It is therefore natural to turn to
the study of lower semicontinuity for nearly-optimal payoff maps. For any given ε > 0 these are set-valued
maps Eε : X ⇒M defined by setting
Eε(X) := {Z ∈M ; X + Z ∈ A, pi(Z) < ρ(X) + ε}.
Instead of focusing on optimal payoffs, we relax the optimality condition and look for all the payoffs that
ensure acceptability at a cost that is close to being minimal. The parameter ε defines the range of tolerance
around the optimal cost. In the language of parametric optimization, Eε is referred to as the ε-optimal set
mapping.
The study of nearly-optimal set mappings is a recurrent theme in parametric optimization and the key result
on lower semicontinuity is Theorem 4.2.4 in Bank et al. (1983). After adapting that result to our framework,
we exploit it to establish a variety of lower semicontinuity results for nearly-optimal payoff maps. To this
effect, we first need the following preliminary lemma, which provides a simple generalization of Lemma 2.2.5
and Corollary 2.2.5.1 in Bank et al. (1983). Here, for X ∈ X we say that a set-valued map S : X ⇒M is
strictly lower semicontinuous at X if for any Z ∈ S(X) there exist open neighborhoods UX ⊂ X of X and
UZ ⊂M of Z such that
Y ∈ UX =⇒ UZ ⊂ S(Y ) .
We say that S is strictly lower semicontinuous if the above property holds for every X ∈ X . Clearly, strict
lower semicontinuity is (typically much) stronger than lower semicontinuity.
Lemma 5.18. For any maps S1,S2 : X ⇒M the following statements hold:
(i) Assume S1 is strictly lower semicontinuous and S2 is lower semicontinuous. Then, the set-valued map
S : X ⇒M given by S(X) = S1(X) ∩ S2(X) is lower semicontinuous.
(ii) Assume S1 is strictly lower semicontinuous and S1(X) ⊂ S2(X) ⊂ clS1(X) for all X ∈ X . Then, S2
is lower semicontinuous.
Proof. (i) Fix X ∈ X and assume S(X) ∩ U 6= ∅ for some open set U ⊂ M. Take Z ∈ S(X) ∩ U and note
that, by strict lower semicontinuity, we find open neighborhoods UX ⊂ X of X and UZ ⊂M of Z such that
UZ ⊂ S1(Y ) for all Y ∈ UX . Since Z ∈ S2(X) ∩ U ∩ UZ , there exists a neighborhood VX ⊂ X of X such
that Y ∈ VX implies S2(Y ) ∩ U ∩ UZ 6= ∅ by lower semicontinuity. As a result, it follows that
S(Y ) ∩ U = S1(Y ) ∩ S2(Y ) ∩ U ⊃ UZ ∩ S2(Y ) ∩ U 6= ∅
for every Y ∈ UX ∩ VX , proving that S is lower semicontinuous.
(ii) Fix X ∈ X . Assume that S2(X) ∩ U 6= ∅ for some open set U ⊂ M and take Z ∈ S2(X) ∩ U . Then,
Z ∈ clS1(X) ∩ U and we can therefore find a sequence (Zn) ⊂ S1(X) such that Zn → Z. In particular,
there exists k ∈ N for which Zk ∈ U . By strict lower semicontinuity, we find open neighborhoods UX ⊂ X
of X and Uk ⊂M of Zk such that Uk ⊂ S1(Y ) for all Y ∈ UX . Then, it follows that
Zk ∈ Uk ∩ U ⊂ S1(Y ) ∩ U ⊂ S2(Y ) ∩ U
for any Y ∈ UX , showing that S2 is lower semicontinuous at X .
Proposition 5.19. Fix X ∈ X and assume the set-valued map F : X ⇒M defined by
F(X) := {Z ∈M ; X + Z ∈ A}
is lower semicontinuous at X. Then, Eε is lower semicontinuous at X for any ε > 0.
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Proof. For any fixed ε > 0 consider the set-valued map H : X ⇒M given by
H(X) = {Z ∈ M ; pi(Z) < ρ(X) + ε}.
It is straightforward to see that H is strictly lower semicontinuous at every point by the continuity of pi and
ρ. Since Eε(X) = F(X) ∩H(X) for all X ∈ X , the assertion is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.18.
Remark 5.20. In parametric optimization the map F is usually referred to as the constraint set mapping.
In our setting, it can be viewed as a generalized version of the set-valued risk measures introduced in Jouini
et al. (2004) and further studied in Hamel and Heyde (2010).
The next theorem is our main result on the stability of nearly-optimal payoff maps.
Theorem 5.21. Assume cl(intA) = A and the set-valued map G : X ⇒M defined by
G(X) := {Z ∈ M ; X + Z ∈ intA}
satisfies G(X) 6= ∅ for all X ∈ X . Then, Eε is lower semicontinuous for every ε > 0.
Proof. For any arbitrary X ∈ X we have G(X) ⊂ F(X) ⊂ cl(G(X)). The first inclusion is obvious. To
establish the second inclusion, note that
F(X) =M∩ (A−X) =M∩ (cl(intA)−X) ⊂ cl(M∩ (intA−X)) = cl(G(X)).
Moreover, note that G is strictly lower semicontinuous. To show this, take X ∈ X and Z ∈ G(X). Since
X+Z ∈ intA, we find open neighborhoods UX ⊂ X of X and UZ ⊂M of Z such that UX+UZ ⊂ intA. This
implies that W ∈ G(Y ) for any Y ∈ UX and W ∈ UZ , showing that G is indeed strictly lower semicontinuous
at X . Hence, we are in a position to apply Lemma 5.18 to infer that F is lower semicontinuous. The
assertion is now a direct consequence of Proposition 5.19.
The above density condition is always satisfied in model spaces where the positive cone has nonempty
interior. This implies, in particular, that nearly-optimal payoff maps are always lower semicontinuous in
finite-dimensional spaces or in spaces of bounded random variables whenever some eligible payoff lies in the
interior of the positive cone.
Corollary 5.22. Assume intX+ ∩M 6= ∅. Then, Eε is lower semicontinuous for every ε > 0.
Proof. Note first that A has nonempty interior since it contains X+. Take any X ∈ A and Z ∈ intX+ ∩M
and set Xn = X +
1
n
Z for all n ∈ N. Clearly, we have Xn → X . We claim that Xn ∈ intA for any fixed
n ∈ N. To see this, consider the neighborhood of Z defined by
UZ = {Y ∈ X ; 2Z ≥ Y ≥ 0}.
Then, we easily see that X+ 1
n
UZ is a neighborhood of Xn contained in X+ and, hence, in A. This establishes
the claim and proves that cl(intA) = A. In view of Theorem 5.21, to conclude the proof it suffices to show
that G(X) 6= ∅ for all X ∈ X . To this effect, take any X ∈ X and note that Z + λX ∈ intX+ for λ > 0
small enough. This yields X + 1
λ
Z ∈ intX+ and shows that G(X) is not empty.
The last part of this section deals with convex acceptance sets. In this case, the density condition cl(intA) =
A is well-known to be satisfied (provided A has nonempty interior). For nearly-optimal payoff maps to be
lower semicontinuous in the convex case, it is therefore sufficient that every position can be made “strictly
acceptable”, i.e. can be moved into the interior of the acceptance set, by means of a suitable eligible payoff.
The next results describe some situations where this can be achieved.
Corollary 5.23. Assume A is convex and int(A∞) ∩M 6= ∅. Then, Eε is lower semicontinuous for every
ε > 0.
Proof. Fix ε > 0 and let Z ∈ int(A∞) ∩M. Then, for any X ∈ X we find λ > 0 small enough so that
λX +Z ∈ int(A∞). Since A∞ is a cone, this is equivalent to X + 1
λ
Z ∈ int(A∞) and shows that G(X) 6= ∅.
As a result of Theorem 5.21, we conclude that E is ε-lower semicontinuous at X .
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In the next result we denote by X++ the set of strictly-positive elements in X . Recall that X ∈ X+ is strictly
positive if ϕ(X) > 0 for all nonzero functional ϕ ∈ X ′+.
Corollary 5.24. Assume A is convex, int(A∞) 6= ∅ and X++ ∩M 6= ∅. Then, Eε is lower semicontinuous
for every ε > 0.
Proof. Let Z ∈ X++ ∩M. The assertion is an immediate consequence of Corollary 5.23 once we show that
Z ∈ int(A∞). To this effect, assume that Z /∈ int(A∞). In this case, by Hahn-Banach, we find a nonzero
functional ϕ ∈ X ′ satisfying (note that 0 ∈ A∞)
ϕ(Z) ≤ σA∞(ϕ) ≤ 0 . (13)
Since A∞ is a cone, Lemma 2.1 implies that ϕ(X) ≥ 0 for all X ∈ A∞. In particular, since X+ ⊂ A, we see
that ϕ ∈ X ′+. This yields ϕ(Z) > 0 by strict positivity, which, however, contradicts (13). As a result, we
conclude that Z must belong to int(A∞).
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